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The U.S. Federal Procurement System: 
An Introduction
By Christopher R. Yukins*
The U.S. procurement market is one of the largest in the world,1 and the procure-
ment law which guides that market, a regulatory regime which is both complex 
and mature,2 offers important lessons for other procurement systems around the 
world. This article provides a modest introduction to U.S. procurement law – 
especially federal procurement law, which generally is more extensively developed 
than state or local procurement law3 – and suggests possible lessons learned that 
may be useful for other systems.
The article proceeds in several parts. Part I reviews the history of the federal 
procurement system, which can be traced to the Revolutionary War. That initial 
part also discusses the contract administration regime that the federal government 
has developed – a separate system, uniquely independent from commercial law 
– and argues that setting the U.S. procurement law regime apart from commer-
cial law makes sense because of the unique requirements (and risk allocations) 
between the government and its contractors. Part II discusses access to the market, 
through transparency for example, and because of international trade agreements 
guaranteeing non-discrimination and national treatment. Part III discusses lead-
ing procurement methods in federal procurement, with a special emphasis on 
the multilateral competitive negotiations that had, by the end of the twentieth 
century, become a mainstay of complex federal procurements. Part IV discusses 
* Christopher Yukins (cyukins@law.gwu.edu) is the Lynn David Research Professor in Government 
Procurement Law and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program at the George 
Washington University (GWU) Law School, Washington, D.C. That program was launched in 
1960 by Professors Ralph Nash, Jr. and John Cibinic, Jr. See https://www.law.gwu.edu/govern-
ment-procurement-law.
1 For data on federal procurement spending, see www.usaspending.gov. Federal government procure-
ment totals approximately US$500 billion per year. Id.
2 The law library at the GWU Law School has one of the leading collections on public procure-
ment law (traditionally called “government contracts law” in the United States), and the librari-
ans there, coordinated by subject matter expert Mary Kate Hunter, mhunter@law.gwu.edu, have 
compiled guides to support research on procurement law. See, e.g., The Jacob Burns Law Library 
Research Guides, Government Contracts Resources, available at http://law.gwu.libguides.com/govk; 
The George Washington University Law School, Jacob Burns Law Library, Government Contracts 
Research, available at https://www.law.gwu.edu/sites/www.law.gwu.edu/files/downloads/SRG_1_
GovernmentContracts.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Danielle Conway, State and Local Government Procurement (American Bar Association 
2012); American Bar Association, Model Code for State and Local Governments (2000), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=PC500500; Guide to State Procurement: A 
50-State Primer on Purchasing Laws, Processes, and Procedures (Melissa Javon Copeland, ed., ABA 
2d ed. 2016).
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the leading contract types (fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts), and 
explains the strategic advantage that the United States gains through an effective 
cost-reimbursement contracting system. Part V discusses bid challenges (called 
“bid protests” in the U.S. system) by disappointed bidders. Part VI reviews some 
of the leading anti-corruption elements in the U.S. system; these are critical to 
the evolution of the U.S. federal system, as (for example) it would have been 
impossible to use riskier competitive negotiations without effective anti-corruption 
protections. The piece concludes by arguing that although the U.S. procurement 
regime is mature it continues to evolve and, given the striking parallels between 
the U.S. system and its counterparts abroad, there will be ample opportunity to 
share lessons learned in the years ahead.
1 A Brief History of the U.S. Federal Procurement System
The history of the federal procurement system in the United States has, in many 
ways, been shaped by armed conflict.4 Through a number of wrenching wars, 
the U.S. procurement system fumbled through a long series of mistakes – and 
internalized the lessons learned from those mistakes. Because the procurement 
system was guided by relatively constant principles5 and a written set of rules 
that evolved over time, the federal procurement system, bound by laws and led 
by officials with real respect for the rule of law, was able to accumulate its lessons 
learned over several centuries. Those lessons spanned beyond contract formation, 
to include bid challenges, contract administration, disputes and appropriations 
law – developments on many fronts which resulted in a highly complex procure-
ment system that continues to evolve today. 
Important patterns in modern federal procurement can be traced back to the 
Revolutionary War, when the Continental Congress several times organized, 
and reorganized, the procurement system to supply the Continental Army.6 That 
very intimate relationship between Congress and procurement (especially defense 
procurement) continues today; indeed, many modern procurement reforms are 
launched through the annual authorizing legislation for the U.S. Department of 
Defense.7 That annual defense authorization legislation, which has consistently 
passed for over 50 years, offers Congress a ready means to continue its long 
4 See, e.g., Clifton E. Mack, Procurement Division, U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Procure-
ment: A Manual for the Information of Federal Purchasing Officers viii (1943).
5 See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11 
Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 103 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304620.
6 See James F. Nagle, History of Government Contracting 16-54 (2d ed. 1999).
7 The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) can be tracked through the U.S. Con-
gress’ home page, www.congress.gov. 
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tradition of tinkering with – improving, through trial and error – the federal 
procurement system.
As the new nation came into being, Congress passed the first laws specifically 
authorizing procurement by a formal contracting process, laws which called for 
notice, competition and public award.8 The new United States inherited this 
traditional contracting system from Europe9; several centuries later, in a historical 
turnabout, the United States would play a prominent role in an international shift 
to multilateral negotiations, called “competitive negotiations” in the U.S. system.10
From early on, the federal system developed a means of addressing contractor 
qualification – what is now called “responsibility” under Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)11 Part 9.12 Only “men of substance and talents” were allowed 
to win government contracts,13 a precursor to today’s highly evolved qualification 
system to assess prospective contractors’ potential reputational and performance 
risks. During these early decades of the republic, the federal government also 
began to delegate substantial discretion to contracting officers.14 Much as the fed-
eral procurement system relies on “responsible” contractors, so too does it depend 
on professional and highly engaged contracting officers, who (like “responsible” 
contractors) sharply reduce the risks of corruption and performance failure.15
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the system of structured solici-
tations and competitive awards, based on low price, was well-established, built 
through practical experience such as awards of stagecoach transportation contracts 
by the young government. The principle that when it contracts the government 
acts not as a sovereign, but as a contracting party subject to the rule of law, grew 
up with the system; that principle, and the concomitant assumptions that the 
government must act in good faith and is subject to a disputes process, evolved 
as bedrock principles of the U.S. system.16
Over the first century of the new republic, before the Civil War began in 1861, 
the federal government worked to develop its own manufacturing capacity, includ-
8 See, e.g., Patricia Wittie, Origins and History of Competition Requirements in Federal Government 
Contracting: There’s Nothing New Under the Sun, at 1-4 (citing early legislative authorities and online 
resources available through the U.S. Library of Congress), available at www.reedsmith.com.
9 See James F. Nagle, supra note 6, at 47-48.
10 See FAR Part 15. In other systems, these multilateral negotiations are sometimes called “competitive 
dialogue”; under Article 29 of European procurement directive 2014/24/EU, a similar method of 
competitive negotiations is called “competitive procedure with negotiation.”
11 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., John Cibinic, Jr., Ralph Nash Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts ch. 4 (4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Formation of Government Contracts].
13 See James F. Nagle, supra note 6, at 50.
14 Id. at 71.
15 One of the largest organizations of contracting professionals, from both the public and the private 
sectors, is the National Contract Management Association, www.ncmahq.org.
16 See James F. Nagle, supra note 6, at 52-72.
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ing its own armories, so that ultimately the government would not need to rely on 
foreign arms manufacturers.17 This was in keeping with attitudes that persist in 
federal procurement today: there is consensus on the need to ensure “security of 
supply” – ready access to vital materiel in a time of war.18 Over this first century 
of its history, the federal government often relied on its own armories, favoring 
“make” over “buy” (to paraphrase); this balance between internal production and 
outsourcing from contractors was driven, in part, by the government’s technolog-
ical dominance in the early phases of American industrialization. (For example, 
Harpers Ferry Armory, the scene of abolitionist John Brown’s 1859 raid which 
helped launch the Civil War, was a U.S. government-owned gun factory.) The 
government’s technological lead largely faded by the end of the twentieth century; 
by that point, the private sector was almost always well ahead of the government, 
and that new asymmetry – that new and durable technological lead in the private 
sector – helped shape the modern procurement methods discussed below.
From very early on, the government and its contractors began to develop the 
legal constructs that define their relationships today, often under the stresses of 
wartime production. In his masterful work on the U.S. system, History of Govern-
ment Contracting, James Nagle describes for example how federal officials jousted 
with renowned inventor and manufacturer Eli Whitney over his company’s huge 
delays in delivering contracted-for guns.19 The angry back-and-forth between the 
officials and Whitney, and similar early contretemps author Jim Nagle describes, 
help explain the severe rules that ultimately grew up around terminations for 
default, as the government clearly needs a strong “stick” to ensure performance. 
At the same time, these histories of protracted wrestling between the government 
and its contractors – a struggle that often stops short of termination – illustrate 
government officials’ risk-averse reluctance to incur the delay and embarrassment 
of termination. That reluctance to terminate in turn helps explain other legal 
doctrines, such as expansive inspection powers,20 demands for strict compliance 
with requirements21 and payment presumptively only after performance,22 which 
give the government additional leverage in these battles with contractors. 
Wartime contracting also helped launch another important doctrine: termi-
nation for convenience.23 Under that doctrine, the government may terminate 
17 Id. at 72. 
18 Cf. European Defence Agency, Directorate General Internal Market and Services, Directive 2009/81/
EC on the award of contracts in the fields of defence and security – Guidance Note: Security of Supply 
(discussing concept), available at https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/guide-sos_en.pdf.
19 See James F. Nagle, supra note 6, at 75-84.
20 See, e.g., FAR 52.246-2, Inspection of Supplies – Fixed-Price (standard inspection clause).
21 John Cibinic, Jr., Ralph Nash, Jr. & James F. Nagle, Administration of Government Contracts 815 
(4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter Administration of Government Contracts].
22 See 31 U.S.C. § 3324; Administration of Government Contracts, supra note 21, at 1135.
23 See FAR Subpart 49.1.
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a contract for the government’s convenience when its need for the good or ser-
vice at issue falls away. Termination for convenience is a doctrine that really 
took shape after the widespread terminations of contracts at the end of World 
War I. The courts confirmed that the government retained the right, as part of 
its inherent sovereign powers, to terminate contracts unilaterally when circum-
stances demand – an extraordinary break from commercial rules of contracting.24 
When the government does terminate for its convenience, the government must 
compensate the contractor for its lost costs on the contract, though not for lost 
profits; unsurprisingly, this is a point of concern for many contractors, especially 
in long-term contracts.
The overall sense of adversity between the government and its contractors – 
stemming, in important part, from government officials’ abiding fear that con-
tractors will, if they can, cheat the federal government – also helps explain the 
draconian penalties for fraud that the U.S. government will impose, both civilly 
and criminally. The government’s actions for civil fraud often stem from a suit 
brought originally by a whistleblower (a “relator,” who by statute may share in 
the government’s recovery from a fraudulent contractor) under the False Claims 
Act.25 The False Claims Act, which has yielded the government and whistleblow-
ers billions of dollars in damages and penalties for fraud,26 plays a unique and 
prominent role in the federal procurement system. With its combination of severe 
monetary penalties (many thousands of dollars per false “claim”), plus treble 
damages, low knowledge requirement (a contractor need only be “reckless” to 
trigger civil fraud liability), and strong incentives for internal “whistleblowers,” 
the U.S. anti-fraud system is arguably one of the most aggressive in the world.
The long and intimate relationship between the government and its contrac-
tors has, over time, built a separate federal procurement community, numbering 
probably over 100,000 people, including hundreds of lawyers who specialize in 
federal procurement law. The special relationship between the government and 
its contractors is shaped by a unique set of policy and commercial concerns, and 
as a result a unique body of law has developed regarding both federal contract 
formation and administration. The separate body of law governing public con-
tract administration – something few countries have – is supported by the FAR’s 
24 See Administration of Government Contracts, supra note 21, at 1049-50 (recounting history and 
authorities regarding terminations for convenience).
25 See generally John T. Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2010); 
U.S. Department of Justice, The False Claims Act: A Primer, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf. 
26 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release: Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion 
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016) (“This is the third highest annual 
recovery in False Claims Act history, bringing the fiscal year average to nearly $4 billion since fiscal 
year 2009, and the total recovery during that period to $31.3 billion.”), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016. 
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standard contract clauses27 and the specialized tribunals (the boards of contract 
appeals, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and on appeal the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit28) that hear cases stemming from contracting 
officer decisions under the Contract Disputes Act.29
Federal procurement law has undergone several important changes over the 
past few decades, largely driven by Congress. The Competition in Contracting 
Act of 198430 now presumptively requires full-and-open competition in federal 
procurement, and regularized the role of the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) in hearing bid protests (GAO had been hearing protests since the 1920s).31 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) transformed much of the federal 
statutory structure, and created special authority for federal agencies to purchase 
commercial items under FAR Part 12 with streamlined rules and procedures.32 
And FASA’s sister legislation, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, furthered FASA’s 
reforms and streamlined information technology procurement – among other 
things, by eliminating special bid challenges regarding IT acquisitions.33 Leg-
islative reforms continue, largely through incremental changes passed (as noted 
above) through every year’s defense authorization legislation.
In closing out this brief history,34 it is important to note a companion body 
of law that has evolved in the U.S. system: fiscal (or appropriations) law, which 
governs how officials should interpret and spend congressional appropriations. 
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with the sole authority to control spending, 
and to protect that prerogative – often in the wake of profligate misuse of funds 
by executive officers – Congress has passed laws barring (and sometimes crim-
27 See, e.g., FAR Part 52 (standard clauses).
28 The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) hears appeals regarding contract disputes from 
most civilian agencies, and the CBCA is complemented by the Defense Department’s Armed Ser-
vices Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Under the Contract Disputes Act, a contractor appeal-
ing a contracting officer’s adverse decision on a contract claim may elect to go to the appropriate 
board of contract appeals, or to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Appeals from the boards and 
from the Court of Federal Claims go to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; from 
there, an appeal can be taken to the U.S. Supreme Court, which may decline review. In modern 
times, the Supreme Court has heard relatively few cases involving federal procurement.
29 41 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.; see FAR Subpart 33.2.
30 See generally Kate Manuel, Competition in Federal Contracting: An Overview of the Legal Require-
ments (Cong. Res. Serv. 2011), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40516.pdf. 
31 See, e.g., Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, but the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 489, 490 (2013); James McKay Weitzel Jr., GAO Bid Protest Procedures under the 
Competition in Contracting Act: Constitutional Implications After Buckley and Chadha, 34 Cath. U. 
L. Rev. 485, 486-87 (1985).
32 See, e.g., Carl L. Vacketta & Susan H. Pope, Commercial Item Contracts: When Is A Government 
Contract Term or Condition Consistent with “Standard” or “Customary” Commercial Practice?, 27 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 291 (1998) (discussing statutory history).
33 See Daniel I. Gordon, supra note 31, at 491 (citing statutory authorities).
34 For an excellent review of the literature on the U.S. procurement system’s history, see James F. 
Nagle, supra note 6, at 579-98.
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inalizing) unauthorized spending, such as the body of laws collectively known 
as the Antideficiency Act.35 The Government Accountability Office (an arm of 
Congress) has developed extensive rules and precedents, gathered in GAO’s Prin-
ciples of Federal Appropriations Law (also known as the “Red Book”36), on how 
appropriations laws should be interpreted and followed. While Article 9 of the 
UN Convention Against Corruption calls generally for fiscal law controls to 
check corruption, it appears that few nations have developed fiscal control rules as 
comprehensive as the United States’ – probably because for the U.S. government, 
fiscal controls are as much about reinforcing democratic structures as they are 
about stopping corruption.
2 Access to the Federal Procurement Market
Access to the federal procurement market can be measured along at least three 
different vectors: the transparency of the system, the trade agreements that open 
that market, and the “invisible” barriers that may make it more difficult for firms 
to join the federal competition. For firms new to the market, access to the fed-
eral market is often gained through several steps: subcontracting to experienced 
prime contractors, then joining an “open” indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity 
(IDIQ) contract (sometimes known as an “open framework” internationally), 
then moving to more specialized (and less intensely competitive) contracting 
vehicles. For a firm new to the marketplace (in part because of the obstacles 
outlined below) it may take several years to move through these stages and gain 
deep access to federal customers. The firms that succeed in penetrating, however, 
typically establish stable and lucrative franchises in the federal market, which 
tends to favor repeat players.
2.1 Transparency: Opportunities, Awards and the Law
Those seeking access to the federal market must, of course, first identify oppor-
tunities and awards, which are (at least in principle) open and transparent for 
significant procurements.37 Both opportunities and awards must be published on 
the “Governmentwide Point of Entry” (GPE), at www.fedbizopps.gov. Related 
documents, such as justifications for other than full-and-open competition, also 
35 E.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1351; see U.S. Accountability Office, The Antideficiency Act, http://www.gao.
gov/legal/anti-deficiency-act/about; Matthew H. Solomson, Chad E. Miller & Wesley A. Demor, 
Fiscal Matters: An Introduction To Federal Fiscal Law & Principles.10-7 Briefing Papers 1 (Thomson 
Reuters, June 2010).
36 https://www.gao.gov/legal/red-book/overview. 
37 See FAR Part 5, Publicizing Contract Actions.
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must be published electronically.38 Data on federal contract awards, available from 
the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), are now also accessible through a 
user-friendly website, usaspending.gov – and procurement data should be more 
readily available in the future, as the federal government implements the “open 
data” requirements of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA) 
Act of 2014, which calls for better transparency regarding federal expenditures.39
There are a number of other federal databases available online which are reg-
ularly relied upon in the procurement community. The website www.sam.gov, 
for example, carries extensive information related to contractor qualification.40 
Firms that will use IDIQ (“framework”) agreements to enter the federal market 
often will look to databases, such as the Schedules Sales Query database,41 pub-
lished by the sponsoring centralized purchasing agency, the U.S. General Services 
Administration, in an effort to gain market information. Finally, a number of 
private firms aggregate and sell data from the federal market.
This is not to say, however, that opportunities and awards in the federal govern-
ment are uniformly transparent. Data on pending and approved federal purchases 
through IDIQ (“framework”) contracts, for example, are notoriously incomplete.42 
And data on subcontract awards, which are supposed to be published for first-tier 
subcontracts,43 are widely believed to be only partially reported and published.44
Statutes45 and regulations46 that govern procurement are published electron-
ically as a matter of course, as are decisions of the boards and courts that hear 
protests (challenges) and claims stemming from federal contracts. Many changes 
to federal procurement law originate in statute, and that legislation’s progress 
through Congress can be tracked, relatively transparently, through the website 
38 FAR 6.305.
39 Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1146 (2014). 
40 See FAR Part 9.
41 https://ssq.gsa.gov/.
42 See, e.g., Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the 
United States Congress, ch. 7 (Jan. 2007).
43 FAR 4.1400 (“This subpart implements section 2 of the Federal Funding Accountability and Trans-
parency Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-282), as amended by section 6202 of the Government Funding 
Transparency Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-252), which requires contractors to report subcontract 
award data …. The public may view first-tier subcontract award data at https://www.usaspending.
gov.”).
44 See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Subcontracting: Linking Small Business 
Subcontractors to Prime Contracts Is Not Feasible Using Current Systems, Report GAO-15-116 (Dec. 
2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667410.pdf. 
45 Titles 10 (Armed Forces) and 41 (Public Contracts) of the U.S. Code contain many of the most 
important provisions regarding federal procurement. 
46 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is available through www.acquisition.gov/far. The 
Defense Department supplements to the FAR, which are extensive, are available through a U.S. 
Air Force-sponsored website, farsite.hill.af.mil. Rules from other federal agencies that affect federal 
procurement, such as the Small Business Administration, are generally available through the Code 
of Federal Regulations, available at www.ecfr.gov. 
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at www.congress.gov. Statutes and other regulatory initiatives generally must 
be implemented through the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which constitutes 
Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations,47 and proposed and final rules are 
regularly published through the Federal Register,48 the daily administrative journal 
for the federal government.
2.3 International Trade Agreements Affording Access
The transparency of the federal market, outlined above, makes that market prac-
tically accessible for vendors from abroad. There is an open question, however, as 
to whether the legal access assured by the United States’ many trade agreements 
regarding procurement can be enforced.49
The starting point in almost any discussion regarding U.S. protectionism is, 
of course, the Buy American Act,50 which was passed in 1933 and now, as imple-
mented, imposes a price preference of 6 or 12 percent (depending on whether 
small businesses are competing), and even 50 percent (for Defense Department 
purchases) (which are discussed further below).51 The Buy American Act has, 
however, been largely displaced by the free trade agreements discussed below; 
as a result, generally only those smaller procurement that fall below the cover-
age threshold of the GPA and other trade agreements are affected by the Buy 
American Act.
There are, however, separate domestic preferences – confusingly known as 
“Buy America” requirements – which limit or bar federal agencies (and, often, 
their grantees) from purchasing foreign goods and services.52 These special “Buy 
America” restrictions are typically carved out as exemptions from the free trade 
agreements discussed below, and they impose severe restrictions on the purchase, 
for example, of foreign trains using federal funds. 
The United States has entered into a number of plurilateral, regional and bilat-
eral free trade agreements touching on procurement, probably the most important 
of which is the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA).53 Under the GPA, the federal government and two-thirds of 
47 www.ecfr.gov. 
48 www.federalregister.gov. 
49 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to 
a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 529 (2007).
50 41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.
51 See, e.g., Allen B. Green, International Government Contract Law ch.2 (West. 2016).
52 See, e.g., Kate M. Manuel, Alissa M. Dolan, Brandon J. Murrill, Rodney M. Perry & Stephen P. 
Mulligan, Domestic Content Restrictions: The Buy American Act and Complementary Provisions of 
Federal Law (Cong. Res. Serv., Sept. 12, 2016), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43354.
pdf. 
53 See generally Sue Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law Int’l 2003) (exten-
sive background and literature regarding free trade agreements in procurement).
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the U.S. states guarantee at least some access to their procurement markets. The 
U.S. Defense Department has also entered into reciprocal defense procurement 
agreements with the ministries of defense in a number of allied countries; those 
agreements, codified in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement 
(DFARS), generally guarantee non-discriminatory access to each partner’s market 
for defense materiel and services. But while access under the GPA and other free 
trade agreements has been codified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its 
supplements,54 and so access is generally honored as a matter of practice in the 
federal acquisition process, there are legal and practical barriers to any foreign 
vendor that seeks to enforce access under trade agreements.55 In sum, foreign 
vendors’ access to the public procurement markets in the United States is far 
from assured, as a legal matter.
2.4 Other Barriers to Access
There are other barriers, some quite formidable, to access in the federal procure-
ment market. One of the most serious is the small business preference imposed 
by law; under that statute, roughly one quarter of federal procurement is tar-
geted for small businesses.56 Although eligible small businesses can, in principle, 
be affiliates of foreign firms, so long as they are based in the United States and 
contribute to the U.S. economy,57 in practice it may be very difficult for a firm 
with ties abroad to qualify as a small business. Taken together, these U.S. small 
business preferences can work a substantial barrier to entry.
Other regulatory requirements can also raise barriers to entry, both for foreign 
firms and for domestic companies. The cybersecurity requirements imposed on 
information technology purchased by the federal government, for example, can 
in practice exclude foreign firms, because while European firms are more likely 
to follow standards more broadly adopted in the European Union, U.S. firms 
are to follow the cybersecurity standards published by the National Institutes 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), which have been adopted by the federal 
government in its procurement.58 These types of practical and legal barriers can 
be mitigated, however, when vendors challenge restrictive requirements, either 
54 See FAR Part 25; DFARS Part 225.
55 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, International Procurement Developments in 2016 – Part I: The Trump 
Administration’s Policy Options in International Procurement, 2017 Gov’t Con. Year in Rev. Br. 3 
(discussing Per Aarsleff decisions). 
56 https://www.sba.gov/contracting/contracting-officials/goaling. 
57 See, e.g., Size Appeal of Global Submit, Inc., SBA No. SIZ-5804, 2017 WL 461190 (SBA OHA, Jan. 
18, 2017).
58 See, e.g., Erik Puskar, The Benefits of U.S.-European Security Standardization (NIST 2012), available 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7861.
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formally through a bid challenge process59 or informally, for example through the 
internal adjudicative process called for by the Defense Department to reconcile 
differing cybersecurity standards.60
It should be emphasized, however, that the sheer bulk of federal procurement 
regulations – which run to thousands of pages – itself works a barrier to access. 
Reformers have often recommended reducing the regulatory bulk, to lower costs 
for business and to minimize barriers to entry.61 Practically speaking, however, 
there are strong countervailing forces, whether born of inertia or bureaucratic 
self-interest, that resist any wholescale dismantling of what is, in fact, a startlingly 
complex regulatory regime. 
3 Leading Procurement Methods in Federal Procurement
To understand the procurement methods used most commonly in the federal 
procurement system, it is probably best to put them in historical context, and 
to see these methods not in isolation but as part of a broader system. As the 
discussion above reflected, at first procurement in the Revolutionary War was 
done, on the colonies’ side, largely through a commissary system run by mer-
chants who received commissions for provisioning the Continental Army.62 That 
eventually matured into a more modern “contract” system, in which vendors 
bid for contract awards on what was generally a sealed-bid, low-price system.63 
The discussion below recounts how that sealed bidding system in time gave way 
to broad use of multilateral competitive negotiations, which is turn was (by the 
end of the twentieth century) complemented by “catalog” contracts (known as 
“indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity” (IDIQ) contracts in the U.S. system, 
and “frameworks agreements” in other countries). These changes were driven by 
technological advances and market shifts, both inside and outside the government, 
and by a desire to make procurement more efficient and to achieve better value. 
59 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide 8 (9th ed. 2009) 
(“Although most protests challenge the acceptance or rejection of a bid or proposal and the award 
or proposed award of a contract, GAO considers protests of defective solicitations (e.g., allegedly 
restrictive specifications ….”), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203631.pdf. 
60 See DFARS.252.204-7008.
61 See, e.g., Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Regulations, Supplement to the 
Section 809 Panel Interim Report (May 2017), available at www.section809panel.org.
62 See James F. Nagle, supra note 6, at 28.
63 Id. at 48; Clifton E. Mack, supra note 4, at 9.
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3.1 Sealed Bidding
Sealed bidding is today governed by Part 14 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 
and though it has been largely superseded by competitive negotiations (discussed 
below), it is still used regularly for procurements with already-detailed specifica-
tions, such as construction projects. Consistent with best practices internationally, 
invitations for sealed bids must describe the government’s requirements clearly, 
and unnecessarily restrictive specifications, or requirements that might unduly 
limit the number of bidders, are not allowed.64 (Unlike the practice under the 
European procurement directives, it is not common to engage in “restricted 
tendering” – in other words, in U.S. federal procurement, it is not common for 
the agency to use an early qualification process to limit the number of vendors 
allowed to bid.65) Contracting officers are personally responsible for reviewing 
the invitation, before publication, to ensure that it does not unnecessarily impair 
competition.66
Invitations for bids are generally to be prepared using a standard format set 
forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).67 Invitations for bids must 
be publicized appropriately,68 allowing vendors reasonable time to prepare their 
bids,69 and then vendors must submit their sealed bids by the time, and at the 
place, specified by the invitation. Invitations to bid may be amended, so long as 
all bidders are given notice of the amendment,70 and invitations may be cancelled 
before bids are opened, but only if cancellation is “clearly in the public interest.”71 
Bids are to be opened publicly, and are to be evaluated without discussions (which 
are the hallmark of competitive negotiations, discussed below).72 
Under sealed bidding, award is to be made to “that responsible bidder” (a 
concept discussed more below) “whose bid, conforming to the invitation for 
bids, will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price and 
the price-related factors included in the invitation.”73 “Price-related factors” may 
include foreseeable costs, such as transportation costs, or price adjustments to 
foreign bids due to the Buy American Act’s price preference.74 
While sealed bidding declined in importance in the latter half of the twentieth 
64 FAR 14.101.
65 See FAR 9.202 (procedural requirements that must be met before list of qualified suppliers can be 
prepared).
66 FAR 14.202-6.
67 FAR 14.201-1(a).
68 FAR 14.203-2 (citing FAR Part 5 provisions regarding publication). 
69 FAR 14.202-1.
70 FAR 14.208.
71 FAR 14.209.
72 FAR 14.101(d). 
73 FAR 14.101(e).
74 FAR 14.201-8; see FAR 25.105 (Buy American Act price preference).
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century, electronic reverse auctions – conceptually, the successor to traditional 
bidding methods – gained in prominence in federal procurement, though the use 
of electronic auctions remained relatively limited.75 While traditional tendering 
procedures contemplate a single set of bids, opened simultaneously, electronic 
reverse auctions extend that concept and allow multiple competing bids, as vendors 
compete to offer successively lower prices in an effort to win the award. The FAR 
notably does not regulate reverse auctions, though the European procurement 
directives76 and many other procurement regimes around the world do.77 Perhaps 
because of the lack of regulation, reverse auctions in the United States have been 
criticized, in some cases, for not providing robust competition.78 
3.2 Multilateral Competitive Negotiations
As discussed above, sealed bidding (akin to “open tendering” abroad) dominated 
federal procurement until the twentieth century, when multilateral competitive 
negotiations became much more important. Traditionally, in times of war the 
federal government had put sealed bidding aside in favor of negotiated contracts, 
to speed mobilization.79 That process expanded through the twentieth century, 
as the federal government embraced multilateral competitive negotiations as a 
favored procurement method. This shift to competitive negotiations reflected the 
federal government’s increasing reliance on the private sector for cutting-edge 
technology, for example in weapons and information technology systems.80 To 
ensure access to the latest technology, the government shifted from sealed bidding 
– which might give the government the lowest price, but on a solution specified 
by the government – to multilateral negotiations which allowed different vendors 
to compete by presenting diverse solutions, and which allowed the government 
to interrogate vendors on the merits of their respective solutions. 
The following table, from a compilation prepared by Umer Chaudhry using 
data published in the Federal Procurement Data System, shows that by fiscal year 
2014, competitive negotiations (referred to as “Negotiated Proposals”) were the 
75 See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office, Reverse Auctions: Guidance Is Needed to Maximize 
Competition and Achieve Cost Savings, Report No. GAO-14-108 (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-108.
76 See EU Directive 2014/24/EU, art. 25.
77 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, ch. 6 (2011), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/2011-Model-Law-on-Public-Procurement-e.pdf. 
78 See, e.g., Danielle Ivory, “Reverse Auctions” Draw Scrutiny, NY Times, Apr. 6, 2014, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/business/reverse-auctions-draw-scrutiny.html. 
79 See, e.g., James Nagle, supra note 6, at 415. 
80 See, e.g., Curtis Lee Coy, The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, at 24-26 (Navy Postgraduate 
School, June 1986) (citing authorities), available at https://archive.org/stream/competitionincon-
00coyc/competitionincon00coyc_djvu.txt. 
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leading method of procurement in the federal government; the percentages are 
of total awards, by dollars:
Solicitation Procedures Fiscal Year 2014: U.S. Government Procurement 
Methods 
Negotiated Proposals: 38.64%
Single Source Solicited: 28.68%
Subject to Multiple Award Fair Opportunity: 21.42%
Simplified Acquisition: 4.27%
None: 2.27%
Sealed Bid: 2.06%
Two Step: 1.14%
Basic Research: 0.88%
Architect – Engineer: 0.42%
No Solicitation Procedure Reported –
Alternative Sources: 0.13%
Program Solicitation: 0.09%
Broad Agency Announcement: 0.00%
Simplified Acquisition Procedures-Non-Competitive: 0.00%
Total 100.00%
The percentage of awards attributable to competitive negotiations (“Negotiated 
Proposals”), roughly 39%, far exceeded those awards made using sealed bidding, 
of roughly 2%. Moreover, over 21% of the awards were made through second-stage 
competitions under IDIQ contracts (“framework” agreements) (listed above as 
awards “Subject to Multiple Award Fair Opportunity”). Those second-stage com-
petitions, amongst catalog contract holders, often carry many of the attributes 
of competitive negotiations.81 Taken together, the awards made by competitive 
negotiations and second-stage competitions amounted to roughly 60% of all 
federal awards, by dollar amount.
Competitive negotiations are governed by Part 15 of the FAR, and those rules 
were subject to a major “rewrite” during the Clinton administration,82 under 
then-Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Steven Kelman 
(who took time away from his long tenure as a professor at Harvard University’s 
John F. Kennedy School of Government). Although the threat of bid challenges 
(called “protests” in the U.S. system) left contracting officials reluctant, even after 
81 Cf. Vernon J. Edwards, Competitive Processes in Government Contracting: The FAR Part 15 Pro-
cess Model and Process Inefficiency (Apr. 2003) (criticizing use of full competitive procedures in 
second-stage awards under standing catalog contracts), available at http://www.wifcon.com/anal/
analcomproc.htm. 
82 The final rule embodying the “rewrite” is at 62 Fed. Reg. 51224 (Sept. 30, 1997), available at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1997-09-30/pdf/97-25666.pdf. 
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the “rewrite,” to use the full panoply of information-gathering tools available 
under FAR Part 15,83 competitive negotiations play a critical role in enabling 
complex federal procurements.
Under the rules, the procedures at FAR Part 15, Contracting by Negotiation, 
may be used for both sole-source and competitive negotiations.84 In practice, 
however, because of the strong bias against sole-source contracting in federal 
procurement,85 competitive negotiations are the norm.
FAR Part 15 contemplates different source selection approaches, depending 
on the nature of the negotiated acquisition. While both of the basic approaches 
assume a search for “best value” – a weighing of price and quality against each 
other – the approaches can vary radically. Where the requirement is “clearly 
definable and the risk of unsuccessful performance is minimal,” the FAR calls 
for making cost or price a dominant role in the award. In that case, a “lowest 
price technically acceptable” (LPTA)-type award may be made, to the tech-
nically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price.86 In practice, an 
LPTA procedure differs materially from a traditional sealed bidding procedure 
in one important respect: under the LPTA procedure, the agency may engage in 
exchanges of information with the offerors,87 which mitigates the risk that the 
agency will make an error during the acquisition.
Alternatively, the agency may engage in a “tradeoff process,” where it is in the 
government’s interest “to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror 
or other than the highest technically rated offeror.”88 The evaluation factors to be 
used in the tradeoff for award – both evaluation factors and significant subfactors 
– must be set forth in the solicitation, and the factors’ “relative importance must 
be clearly stated in the solicitation.”89 These requirements parallel those of the 
European procurement directive90 and the UNCITRAL model law.91 
83 See, e.g., David A. Whiteford, Negotiated Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain, 32 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 509 (2003). In 2011, then-Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Daniel Gordon (who subsequently served as an associate dean in GWU’s procurement law 
program) issued his well-known “myth-buster” memorandum, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/memo/Myth-Busting.pdf, which encouraged contracting 
officials to engage more broadly with industry in the acquisition process, under the authorities 
created by FAR Part 15.
84 FAR 15.002.
85 See FAR Subpart 6.3 (procedural requirements that must be met before employing other than full-
and-open competition).
86 FAR 15.101-2.
87 FAR 15.101-2(b)(4).
88 FAR 15.101(a).
89 FAR 15.101-1(b)(1).
90 EU Directive 2014/24/EU, Recital (45).
91 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, supra note 77, Art. 11(5) (c) (solicitation must set 
forth the “relative weights of all evaluation criteria”).
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As in other systems,92 the U.S. rule structure leaves the procuring federal agency 
with flexibility in weighing the various factors during the evaluation process. 
This flexibility presumably comes because if contracting officials’ discretion is 
bound too tightly by the solicitation’s evaluation factors – if, for example, award 
in a competitive negotiation must be based upon a rigid formula, as is sometimes 
suggested in other procurement regimes – that rigid loss of discretion would rob 
officials’ of their ability to consider, and weigh, new and innovative solutions put 
forward by offerors. The GAO has said that an agency’s source selection authority 
(the deciding official, in the U.S. system) may not make an award decision based 
solely upon a mechanical formula set forth in the solicitation.93 These GAO rul-
ings, part of a pattern of bid challenge decisions,94 offered an important lesson: 
although it is tempting to bind the awarding official to a predetermined formula 
so as to reduce the risk of corruption, robbing that official of all discretion in the 
evaluation will, in essence, strip the competitive evaluation of much of its value, 
and return the agency to the days of sealed bidding/open tendering when award 
was made based upon rigid criteria defined before the government entered the 
rich diversity of the marketplace.
To access that market information, FAR Part 15 affords the government a 
number of ways to engage with vendors: through meetings and exchanges during 
the acquisition planning process,95 through written exchanges and negotiations,96 
and through oral presentations (though those are optional) and debriefings after 
award. The debriefings are, at their core, intended to help vendors prepare better 
offers in later competitions. (Notably, both the winner and the losers are entitled 
to request debriefings.) As a practical matter, however, debriefings also play a 
pivotal role in bid protests (discussed further below): agencies hope that thorough 
debriefings will dissuade disappointed offerors from protesting, and a protester 
often will rely closely on the information disclosed in a debriefing to argue that 
the award was flawed. 
92 See, e.g., Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 196 (2012) 
(Model Law “contains detailed rules regulating the procedures … which are designed to include 
safeguards against possible abuses or improper use of this method and robust controls. Nonetheless, 
they also preserve the necessary flexibility and discretion on the part of the procuring entity in the 
use of the method, without which the benefits of the procedure disappear.”), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement-2011/Guide-Enactment-Mod-
el-Law-Public-Procurement-e.pdf. 
93 E.g., C & B Constr., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-401988.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 1 (Jan. 6, 2010) (sustaining protest 
because contemporaneous evaluation record consisted merely of numerical scores assigned to each 
vendor’s quotation, and lacked any information to show a basis for those scores, or a reasoned basis 
for any tradeoff judgments made in the source selection).
94 See Formation of Government Contracts, supra note 12, at 678-69 (reviewing authorities).
95 FAR 15.201.
96 As noted, see supra text accompanying note 83, too often contracting officials will stop short of open 
exchanges with vendors because of a fear that those discussions may trigger a bid challenge.
85
The U.S. Federal Procurement System: An Introduction
3.3 “Catalog” Contracts/Framework Agreements: Indefinite-
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contracting
As the discussion above explained, competitive negotiations came to dominate 
federal procurement by the late twentieth century. In the 1990s, however, and 
partly as a result of enabling legislation in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act of 1994, a different contracting method – known most commonly in the U.S. 
federal system as “indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity” (IDIQ) contracting – 
came to the front ranks of federal contracting methods. 
This method is commonly referred to as “catalog” contracting, as contractors 
will typically agree to sell an array of goods and services to the government under 
a master catalog contract, known as a “framework agreement” in other jurisdic-
tions (such as the European Union). The master catalog contract generally will 
set forth ceiling unit prices; when the contracting agency (or another user agency) 
orders from the master contract, however, the ordering agency may negotiate 
lower prices, sometimes by running a “mini-competition”97 among the contract 
holders. The government originally may award only a small, fixed number of 
master contracts (known as a “closed” framework under the UNCITRAL model 
law),98 or may allow additional vendors to join the arrangement over time (an 
“open” framework). How the arrangement is structured – for example, how long 
the master catalog contracts are valid, how many vendors hold master contracts, 
and how orders under those master contracts are notified and competed99 – can 
have profound impacts on the success of the contracting method.
There are two different types of catalog contracts in the U.S. federal system, 
the Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) contracts administered by the U.S. Gen-
eral Services Administration (GSA) under FAR Part 8, and the IDIQ contracts 
run by other agencies (typically purchasing agencies providing centralized ser-
vices to other user agencies) under FAR Subpart 16.5. The two regimes differ in 
small but important ways, for example in the notice and transparency regarding 
opportunities and awards, in the extent of competition, and in whether awarded 
orders can be protested (what abroad might be called challenges to “framework 
contracts” under standing framework agreements).100
97 The term is British, though the concept applies equally well to processes in the United States. 
See, e.g., UK Department of Education, Run a mini-competition between suppliers on a framework, 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/buying-for-schools/3b-run-a-mini-competition-between-suppliers-
on-a-framework.
98 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, supra note 77, Art. 2(3)(ii) (“‘Closed framework 
agreement’ means a framework agreement to which no supplier or contractor that is not initially a 
party to the framework agreement may subsequently become a party.”).
99 See generally Gian Luigi Albano & Caroline Nicholas, The Law and Economics of Framework Agree-
ments (Cambridge U. Press 2016).
100 See FAR Subpart 8.4 (GSA MAS contracts); FAR Subpart 16.5 (IDIQ contracts).
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Probably the most important difference between IDIQ contracts and the GSA 
Multiple Award Schedule contracts is how they control for price. Unlike “closed” 
IDIQ contracts, which force vendors to compete to join, as noted the GSA MAS 
contracts are “open” frameworks – they are standing catalog contracts, and new 
contractors can apply to join at any time. As a result, it is very difficult to use 
competition between contractors to control price or quality as contractors join 
the standing arrangements, for it would be difficult to demand competition 
from such potentially disparate vendors and still maintain a robust and efficient 
open framework. The GSA MAS contracts therefore harness competitive forces 
outside the government marketplace, in the commercial marketplace, to control 
prices: under a “most favored customer” provision known as the “Price Reduc-
tions Clause,”101 MAS contractors must vow to reduce their MAS prices if they 
reduce their commercial prices. Although GSA has announced that in the future 
it intends to rely more on prices paid data and less on this most favored customer 
strategy102 – among other things, a most favored customer commitment creates 
onerous fraud risks for contractors103 – the clause highlights the special challenges 
raised by an “open” framework agreement, such as GSA’s MAS contracts.
4 Types of Contracts: Fixed-Price and 
Cost-Reimbursement
In the U.S. federal system, there are two basic types of contracts: fixed-price and 
cost-based104 Fixed-price contracts (which include firm-fixed-price (“turnkey” 
or “complete solution”) contracts, and fixed-price contract with economic price 
adjustments (for inflation, for example)) are much like contracts in other procure-
ment markets around the world. Importantly, all federal contracts for commercial 
items under FAR Part 12 – a substantial portion of the market – are required to 
be fixed-price contracts.105 
Cost-reimbursement contracts, in contrast, are typically used for riskier proj-
ects, because the government presumptively absorbs much of the cost and per-
formance risks. The federal government’s well-established system for cost-reim-
bursement contracting arguably gives the United States a strategic advantage, for 
101 GSAR 552.238-75 – Price Reductions.
102 See U.S. General Services Administration, GSA Acquisition Rule Captures Transactional Data, 
Drives Savings and Eliminates Burdensome Reporting, available at https://www.gsa.gov/portal/con-
tent/137210. 
103 See, e.g., Aaron Woodward, The Perverse Effect of the Multiple Award Schedules’ Price Reductions 
Clause, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 527 (2012); Multiple Award Schedule Advisory Panel Final Report 5 (Feb. 
2010) (distinguished agency/stakeholder panel, noting that Price Reduction Clause is not effective), 
available at https://www.gsa.gov/graphics/staffoffices/MAS_Panel_Final_Report_Signatures.pdf. 
104 See Formation of Government Contracts, supra note 12, ch. 9.
105 FAR 12.207. 
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the mature cost-reimbursement system allows the U.S. government to undertake 
much riskier initiatives in developing, for example, new weapons or vehicles for 
space exploration. While cost-reimbursement contracts are less common, they 
constitute an important subset of the federal market: many of the largest contracts, 
for weapons development for example, are done on a cost-reimbursement basis, 
and often only the larger and more sophisticated contractors have the necessary 
accounting systems and controls in place to handle the complex rules and pro-
cedures of cost-reimbursement contracting.106 New entrants to the market, such 
as emerging information technology contractors and foreign vendors, are far less 
likely to undertake a cost-reimbursement contract. 
5 Challenges to Procurement: Bid Protests 
in the Federal System
Over the past few decades, through international trade agreements and other 
channels, the United States has pressed other nations to adopt systems for bid 
challenges (known as “bid protests” in the U.S. federal system). The WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) requires that members have a 
bid challenge system in place,107 and the UN Convention Against Corruption 
(which has been adopted by most nations) specifically calls in Article 9 for an 
“effective” system of domestic review, including an effective system of appeal, in 
each member nation.108
Under the U.S. system, which is very similar to remedies systems now in 
place in many nations,109 prospective bidders and offerors may challenge flawed 
solicitations before the time set for the submission of bids or proposals, and after 
award the disappointed bidders or offerors may challenge flaws in the award 
process. Although bid protests can be controversial – protests raise costs and 
delays, and often make the relationship between bidders and government officials 
more adversarial – protests have proven an essential means of holding officials 
accountable for failures in the procurement system, and thus for preserving the 
public legitimacy of the procurement system.
In the U.S. system (as in many other systems elsewhere in the world), pro-
106 See FAR 16.301-3.
107 See, e.g., Xinglin Zhang, Constructing a System of Challenge Procedures to Comply with the Agreement 
on Government Procurement, in The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform 
483 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert Anderson, eds., Cambridge U. Press 2011).
108 UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), Art. 9, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/
CAC/. 
109 See, e.g., OECD, Public Procurement Review and Remedies Systems in the European Union, SIGMA 
Papers, No. 41 (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2007), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5km-
l60q9vklt-en. 
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tests can be brought in any one of three different forums: in the contracting 
agency itself, at an independent agency charged with hearing bid protests (the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)), or in court (at the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims). As noted, in any of the three forums, a protest regarding 
the terms of a solicitation (regarding unreasonably restrictive specifications, for 
example) generally must be brought before bids or proposals are due.110 The 
deadlines for post-award protests are more complicated: at the procuring agency 
and at GAO, a post-award protest must be brought within 10 days of when the 
protester knew or should have known of the grounds for protest,111 though that 
period can be extended for several days at the GAO if the protester requests, and 
receives, a debriefing.112 At the Court of Federal Claims, in contrast, there is no 
fixed deadline for submission of post-award protests.113 
Procedures at the three forums also vary widely. In an agency-level protest, 
brought at the contracting agency itself, the protester generally requests that the 
agency shift the review to a level above the contracting officer, in an effort to 
ensure at least some measure of independence.114 The agency need not provide 
the protester with the administrative record, however, nor allow the protester an 
opportunity to probe the agency’s failures. As a result of these and other procedural 
constraints, agency-level protests are generally viewed with disfavor by vendors, 
and are relatively seldom used.
Procedures at the primary forum used – GAO – are more complex. After the 
protest is filed, the agency report relating to the protest grounds must be pro-
duced within 30 days, with the relevant administrative record.115 The protester 
and the intervenor (the awardee) generally have ten days to respond, and if the 
administrative record reveals new grounds for protest, the protester may supple-
ment its original grounds of protest.116 The protester must show that the protested 
error prejudiced the protester – caused the protester to lose the award, in other 
words – in order to prevail.117 While only a relatively small percentage of federal 
awards are protested at GAO every year, and the percentage of successful protests 
that result in an eventual award is even smaller, the prospect of an adverse GAO 
110 E.g., FAR 33.103(e).
111 See, e.g., FAR 33.103(e); 4 C.F.R. § 21.2 (GAO bid protest rule).
112 4 C.F.R. § 21.2.
113 See, e.g., U.S. Court of Federal Claims Rules, App. C, Procedure in Procurement Protest Cases Pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b); Raymond M. Saunders & Patrick Butlera, A Timely Reform: Impose 
Timeliness Rules for Filing Bid Protests at the Court of Federal Claims, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 539 (2010).
114 FAR 33.103(d)(4).
115 4 C.F.R. § 21.3.
116 See GAO, Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive Guide, http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/bid/filing.
html. 
117 See Formation of Government Contracts, supra note 12, at 1735-40. 
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decision drives many agencies to act more deliberately, and to take corrective 
action promptly when a strong protest emerges.118
Although GAO is by far the most popular bid protest forum and is generally 
acknowledged as the leading authority on issues of federal contract formation,119 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims offers an alternative bid protest forum – and a 
possible line of second, largely de novo review, should the GAO rule in the first 
instance against the protest. Bid protests at the Court of Federal Claims’ are not 
limited to 100 days, as they are at the GAO, and the sometimes more expansive 
process at the Court of Federal Claims can make protests more costly to litigate; 
this helps explain vendors’ preference for the GAO. By the same token, though, 
the judges of the Court of Federal Claims, and on appeal the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (or even the Supreme Court) may allow more 
probing discovery of the agency, and may be willing to apply a more demanding 
standard of review or develop new doctrine – outcomes that may not be possible 
at the GAO, which tends to apply a conservative standard of review, and which 
offers no formal right of appeal. As a result, protesters will sometimes bring more 
difficult cases directly to the Court of Federal Claims.
Unlike protest forums in other nations, which may provide much broader relief 
(even lost profits) to a party wrongfully denied an award, post-award relief for a 
successful protester in the U.S. forums tends to be much more circumscribed: gen-
erally minimal attorney fees, the bid and proposal costs incurred by the protester, 
and a direction (or recommendation, in the case of GAO) that the competition 
be corrected and reopened. While these may seem a paltry reward in comparison 
to the costs of bringing a bid protest, and of antagonizing an agency customer, 
the flexible utility of protests – including, importantly, the ability of agencies to 
resolve a strong protest by taking immediate corrective action – makes them an 
enduring, and important, part of the federal procurement system.
6 Anti-Corruption Measures
Beyond the bid challenge system outlined above, the federal government has 
evolved a substantial array of additional anti-corruption strategies and institutions. 
Two important aspects of these anti-corruption measures bear special mention. 
First, these anti-corruption measures are not directed solely at what one might 
call corruption in the traditional sense, such as bribes and gratuities. Instead, 
118 See generally Moshe Schwartz & Kate M. Manuel, GAO Bid Protests: Trends and Analysis (Cong. 
Res. Serv. July 21, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40227.pdf. 
119 See, e.g., Michael J. Schaengold, T. Michael Guiffré & Elizabeth M. Gill, Choice of Forum for Federal 
Government Contract Bid Protests, 18 Fed. Circuit B.J. 243 (2009) (discussion of the three bid protest 
forums, with statistics), available at http://cfcbar.org/upload/2009-Choice-of-Forum-for-Federal-
Government-Contract-Bid-Protests.pdf. 
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these anti-corruption measures in the federal government – which track similar 
measures in governments around the world – generally address a broader range 
of failures in the procurement system, from bribery to indifference in contracting 
officials. They are, in other words, broadly aimed at failures arguably inherent 
to any system that entrusts purchasing to an agent, and performance to a prof-
it-seeking contractor.120
Second, the various federal anti-corruption instruments (some of which are 
discussed below) are not well-coordinated – a prosecutor investigating a contrac-
tor’s bribe, for example, may fail to coordinate in any effective way with other 
enforcement officials proceeding against the contractor. While this seems disor-
ganized, the lack of coordination means that a contractor that decides to indulge 
in corruption faces a much more variegated legal risk – one that is difficult to 
assess, and probably impossible to control.
6.1 Criminal Sanctions
Although most of the traditional criminal bars against corruption121 – against 
bribery and gratuities, for example, and against unlawful conflicts of interest – are 
lodged in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, there are notable exceptions. For example, 
both the Procurement Integrity Act122 (which imposes criminal sanctions for 
“leaking” bid or proposal information) and the Anti-Kickback Act123 (which 
punishes commercial bribery between prime contractors and subcontractors) are 
lodged in Title 41, the general public contracts code. 
6.2 Ethics
The ethics codes in the U.S. procurement system are generally rigorously hon-
ored and enforced,124 and those ethics codes are tightly integrated with criminal 
sanctions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 208, for example, personal conflicts of interest in 
seeking employment may trigger criminal sanctions unless the activity at issue 
is permitted by ethics regulations published by the U.S. Office of Government 
120 See, e.g., Peter Trepte, Regulating Procurement, ch. 2.3 (Oxford U. Press 2004) (discussing princi-
pal-agent theory in procurement): Albert Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Compe-
tition Rules 56-57 & n.58 (Hart Publishing, 2d ed. 2015) (canvassing literature on agency theory); 
Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent 
Model, 40 Pub. Cont. L. J. 63 (2010), available at http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publica-
tions/996/. 
121 See Formation of Government Contracts, supra note 12, at 148-219.
122 41 U.S.C. ch. 21.
123 41 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
124 See generally Jessica Tillipman, Gifts, Hospitality and the Government Contractor,14-7 Briefing Pap. 
1 (Thomson Reuters/West June 2014). The U.S. Office of Government Ethics (OGE) maintains an 
excellent resource website on ethics laws and rules, at www.oge.gov. 
91
The U.S. Federal Procurement System: An Introduction
Ethics (OGE), and under 18 U.S.C. § 207, the director of the OGE may waive 
certain employment restrictions. The ethics rules, in other words, can provide a 
safe harbor from criminal prosecution, and the ethics regime works hand-in-hand 
with the harsher criminal sanctions. Nor is the ethics regime unidimensional: 
while the general ethics rules administered by the OGE apply to all executive 
branch employees, an additional layer of stricter rules applies under the Procure-
ment Integrity Act (discussed above) to senior procurement officials.125
6.3 Corporate Compliance
The ethics regime discussed above is relevant far beyond government, for in 
many ways it receives “mirror” enforcement in the contractor community, under 
the compliance systems required by the FAR.126 Corporate compliance, which 
previously launched in the U.S. private sector under the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission’s organizational sentencing guidelines, in 2008 became a standard part 
of federal contracting.127 While contractor “self-cleaning” under Article 57 of 
the European procurement directive 2014/24/EU is to occur after a bad act has 
occurred, as the contractor seeks to redeem itself,128 under the U.S. system a 
contractor is required constantly to “clean” itself – to implement and enforce a 
vigorous system of compliance as soon as it becomes a significant contractor.129 
As part of that constant “cleansing” under the corporate compliance rules, a 
contractor is required to implement internal rules that mirror the government’s 
ethics rules. Thus, for example, because federal gift rules are generally triggered 
for gifts over $20, or for cumulative annual gifts over $50 from one source,130 a 
contractor code of conduct – an essential part of any compliance system – may 
instruct the contractor’s employees to coordinate and limit their gifts to individual 
government officials in accordance with these strict rules.
6.4 Debarment
Corporate “self-cleaning,” as it is called in Europe, also plays a pivotal role in 
debarment (exclusion) in the U.S. system. By law, debarment is not to be a pun-
ishment;131 instead, it is a means for federal agencies to exclude contractors that 
125 See FAR 3.104-3.
126 See FAR 52.203-13 (clause) and FAR Subpart 9.4 (debarment standards).
127 See 73 Fed. Reg. 67064 (Nov. 12, 2008) (final rule). 
128 See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: Regulation in the EU and UK 
1271-72 (Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 3d ed. 2014).
129 See FAR 52.203-13; FAR 3.1004(a).
130 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204. See generally The Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive 
Branch, 5 C.F.R. Part 2635.
131 See FAR 9.402(b) (“The serious nature of debarment and suspension requires that these sanctions 
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pose particular risks, such as reputational or performance risks. Unlike the World 
Bank’s sanctions system, which is rigidly adjudicative, the U.S. system is highly 
flexible. Thus, though the contractor facing debarment is entitled to a hearing 
before the agency suspending and debarring official (SDO),132 that hearing is 
in practice a very flexible event, and the SDO may use the opportunity not for 
fact-finding but rather to press the contractor to adopt more aggressive internal 
controls, which in turn may be reflected in an administrative agreement between 
the agency and the contractor. Suspension and debarment in the U.S. system 
are, in sum, tools of risk mitigation, not a sanctions regime to punish wayward 
contractors.
6.5 Civil Society and Legislative Oversight
Both civil society and Congress play active roles in overseeing the procurement 
system, to ensure its integrity. Members of civil society – journalists, various non-
profit organizations and academics, for example – have gained greater insight into 
the federal procurement system as that system has grown more transparent. Their 
access is likely to deepen in the coming years, as principles of “open government” 
are implemented in the federal government, through reforms such as the DATA 
Act, which requires greater transparency regarding the government’s expendi-
tures.133 At the same time, Congress will continue to play an important role in 
day-to-day oversight. Notably, some of the largest scandals of recent years were 
unearthed, at least in part, through congressional oversight. Senator John McCain 
(R-AZ) and his staff, for example, were among the first to unearth disturbing 
evidence that Darleen Druyun, one of the leading Air Force procurement officials 
of her time, was tangled in an illegal conflict of interest with contractor Boeing.134 
Although congressional oversight is typically most intense when the White House 
and Congress are controlled by different political parties, procurement policy is, 
at its heart, not a partisan issue, and Congress’ oversight and reform initiatives 
are, as noted, central elements of the U.S. procurement system. 
be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s protection and not for purposes of 
punishment.”).
132 See, e.g., FAR 9.406-3(b)(2) (“In actions not based upon a conviction or civil judgment, if it is found 
that the contractor’s submission in opposition raises a genuine dispute over facts material to the 
proposed debarment, agencies shall also … [a]fford the contractor an opportunity to appear with 
counsel, submit documentary evidence, present witnesses, and confront any person the agency 
presents”); Formation of Government Contracts, supra note 12, at 494-96.
133 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Caroline Daniel and Demetri Sevastopulo, Inside the ‘ iron triangle’: armed with e-mails, 
John McCain battles the US defence establishment, Fin. Times, Jan. 28, 2005.
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7 Conclusion
As the discussion above reflects, although the laws and practices that shape the 
U.S. federal procurement system have a deep and rich history of their own, in 
many ways they reflect parallel developments emerging in other jurisdictions. 
The history of the U.S. procurement system shows that a regulatory structure 
can continue to evolve over many centuries, accumulating lessons learned in a 
system that honors the rule of law, and sharing those lessons with other systems 
around the world. 
